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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a study on detecting cyberattacks on industrial
control systems (ICS) using unsupervised deep neural networks,
specifically, convolutional neural networks. The study was per-
formed on a SecureWater Treatment testbed (SWaT) dataset, which
represents a scaled-down version of a real-world industrial water
treatment plant. e suggest a method for anomaly detection based on
measuring the statistical deviation of the predicted value from the
observed value. We applied the proposed method by using a variety
of deep neural networks architectures including different variants
of convolutional and recurrent networks. The test dataset from
SWaT included 36 different cyberattacks. The proposed method
successfully detects the vast majority of the attacks with a low false
positive rate thus improving on previous works based on this data
set. The results of the study show that 1D convolutional networks
can be successfully applied to anomaly detection in industrial con-
trol systems and outperform more complex recurrent networks
while being much smaller and faster to train.
KEYWORDS
Anomaly detection; Industrial control systems; convolutional neu-
ral networks
1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are widely used and vital to the
operation of various sectors, including the pharmaceutical industry,
manufacturing, and critical infrastructures, such as electricity, wa-
ter treatment plants, and oil refineries. Historically, these systems
ran on proprietary hardware and software in physically secure
locations, but more recently they have adopted common informa-
tion technology (IT) technologies and remote connectivity. These
changes increase the likelihood of cyber security vulnerabilities
and incidents [36]. A number of high impact cyber attacks were
reported in recent years, including the attack on a power plant in
the Ukraine in December 2015 [41], the infamous Stuxnet malware
that targeted nuclear centrifuges in Iran, and recent attacks on a
Saudi oil company [4].
Thus, the ability to detect cyberattacks on ICSs has become a
critical task. One of the approaches used to address this problem
involves utilizing traditional IT network-based intrusion detection
Systems (IDSs) to identify malicious activity. In this work we focus
on an anomaly detection approach, in which we attempt to detect
anomalous behavior of the system on the physical level. This ap-
proach is based on the assumption that the ultimate goal of the
attacker is to influence the physical behavior of the system, and
aims at protecting the system beyond the network-level line of
defense. Physical level-based anomaly detection can also facilitate
early detection and remediation of faulty equipment, which can be
of a great economical value.
Anomaly detection methods can be based on rules or models of
the system [31] [38] [20]. Unfortunately, creating a precise model
of complex physical processes is a very challenging task. It requires
an in depth understanding of the system and its implementation,
which is a time consuming and cannot scale up to large and complex
systems. Another approach that has recently been the focus of inter-
est utilizes machine learning to model ICSs and detect anomalous
behavior. A number of works using supervised machine learning
for anomaly detection in ICSs have been published recently [1] [14].
This approach requires labeled training data for normal and attack
scenarios, however, labeled data for cyberattacks may be difficult
to acquire, and this data will naturally not include unknown attack
classes. Recently, unsupervised machine learning was shown to
be effective [8] [18] for detecting cyberattacks using data obtained
from a dedicated water plant testbed (SWaT)[7] that was built to
support research related to the design of secure cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs). In [8] the authors use recurrent neural network (RNN)
to detect attacks on a single stage of a six-stage water purification
process, and report detection of nine out of ten attacks with four
false positives. In addition, [18] compare the performance of a long
short term memory (LSTM)-based deep neural network (DNN) and
one-class SVM to detect attacks on all stages of the same process.
They show some improvement, with F1 = 0.8 for DNN when mea-
sured per log record. However, when relating to specific attacks, 23
out of 36 have a recall = 0.
In this work, we present further research on different architec-
tures of unsupervised DNN to detect cyberattacks on all stages of
the SWaT dataset. The contributions of this papers are:
• a method for anomaly detection for multi-variant industrial
process time series data;
• successful use of 1D convolutional neural networks (CNN)
for detecting anomalies and cyberattacks in ICS data with
few false positives; the model is able to achieve this perfor-
mance by combining the detection for individual stages in
the process;
• a comparison of the efficiency of different neural network
architectures for anomaly detection in ICSs.
2 RELATEDWORK
Anomaly and intrusion detection in industrial control systems (also
called cyber physical systems) have been extensively studied. A
number of comprehensive surveys are dedicated to the classifica-
tion of techniques and methodologies in this area (e.g., [10] and
[29]). A well-known approach to intrusion detection in ICS is based
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on modeling and simulation of the system [31], [38]. Practical prob-
lems with this approach are the need for precise knowledge of the
system’s design and configurations, as well as the need to accu-
rately modeling the system’s complex physical behavior. Accord-
ing to Mitchell et al. [29], ICS anomaly detection methods include
knowledge and behavior-based methods. Knowledge-based detec-
tion techniques search for known attack characteristics, similar
to malware signature techniques in IT intrusion detection. While
having low false positive rates, these approaches require maintain-
ing an updated dictionary of attack signatures and are ineffective
against zero-day attacks. In contrast, behavior-based techniques
search for anomalies in runtime behavior. These techniques are
more common in ICS intrusion detection, since ICS systems are
automated and present more regularity and predictability than
typical IT systems. The proposed method utilizes behavior-based
techniques.
Another approach to classifying intrusion detection methodolo-
gies is based on the data being monitored. Numerous studies have
presented network traffic-based intrusion detection [25]. Ghaeini
et al. [6] use this approach on the SWaT dataset used in our study.
In this work we have study an alternative approach based on the
data collected from the sensors and actuators, thus focusing on the
system behavior at the physical layer.
Anomaly detection techniques used in ICS intrusion detection
can be broadly divided into supervised, unsupervised and semi-
supervised techniques. Supervised techniques require prior labeling
of the system behavior, including the samples of malicious behavior.
Acquiring precise and representative labeled data is very hard to
obtain in practice, and this data is highly dependent on the specific
system. Therefore, most of recent research on ICS intrusion detec-
tion uses unsupervised (unlabeled data from real data) [15] and
semi-supervised (training from a set of clean data with no anom-
alies) approaches. Unsupervised SCADA intrusion detection was
investigated in [27] which describes a technique based on one-class
SVM and k-means clustering. Semi-supervised learning approaches
are trained using a collection of "good" data, which is assumed to
completely represent normal system behavior and contain no at-
tacks. While both assumptions should be examined closely, they can
be fulfilled in many practical situations. Semi-supervised methods
usually have lower false-positive rates than their fully unsupervised
alternatives [43], [42].
Multiple machine learning techniques are used in ICS anomaly
detection. They include support-vector machine [27] [14], random
forest [1] as well as artificial neural network [25], [5] and others.
In the past few years some research has been performed applying
deep and recurrent neural networks to this area [28], [8], [18].
In our research 1D convolutional neural networks (1D CNNs) are
used, and demonstrate superior attack detection abilities and higher
F1 scores than previously published papers [8], [18]. Previously,
1D CNNs were used for detecting faulty motor bearings based
on univariant motor current data [17]. In this study we apply 1D
CNNs to multivariant time series data and use it to detect multiple
instances of cyberattacks. To the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first to use 1D CNNs for cyberattacks detection in ICSs.
3 SECUREWATER TREATMENT (SWAT)
TESTBED DATASET
The Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed was built by the Sin-
gapore University of Technology and Design in order to provide
researchers with data collected from a realistic complex ICS envi-
ronment. Although a detailed description of the testbed and the
dataset can be found in [7], we will provide a brief description be-
low. The testbed is a fully operational scaled down water treatment
plant that produces purified water.
As shown in Figure 1, the water goes through a six-stage process,
each stage (from P1 to P6) is equipped with a number of sensors
and actuators. Sensors include flow meters, water level meters,
conductivity and pH analyzers and more. Actuators include pumps
that transfer water from stage to stage, pumps that dose chemicals,
and valves that control inflow. The process is not circular, and the
water from P6 is disposed. The sensors and the actuators at each
stage are connected to the corresponding PLC (programmable logic
controller), and the PLCs are connected to the SCADA system as
shown in Figure 2.
The data from all of the sensors and actuators was logged every
second in a Historian server, and this data was used for training
and testing the system. The dataset also contains recorded network
traffic, but this was not used in our work. The dataset contains seven
days of recording under normal conditions and an additional four
days of recordingwhen 36 attackswere conducted. The attackswere
Figure 1: SWaT Testbed Process Overview [7]
Figure 2: SWaT Testbed Network Overview [7]
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Figure 3: Attack 21 on the LIT101 sensor [7]
conducted by altering the network traffic in the Level 1 network,
spoofing the sensors values and issuing fake SCADA commands.
Attacks include (a) attacks that target a single stage of the process
and (b) attacks acting simultaneously at different stages. A table
listing the attacks and the corresponding attack times, attack points,
and expected and factual outcomes is provided [7]. For example,
attack 21 aims at overflowing the tank at the stage P1. For that
purpose, the value of the level sensor LIT101 is fixed at 700mm
while the motorized valve controlling water inflow is kept open for
12 minutes.
Figure 3 (from [7]) shows the attack, its influence on the LIT101
sensor and the time it takes the system to stabilize. The entire
dataset contains 946,722 records, labeled as either attack or nor-
mal, with 51 attributes corresponding to the data from sensors and
actuators.
4 BACKGROUND ON NEURAL NETWORKS
4.1 Recurrent Neural Networks
This section provides a brief introduction to recurrent neural net-
works (RNNs), for a detailed discussion, please refer to Lipton et
al. [26]. Traditional feed-forward neural networks assume inde-
pendence among samples, resetting the state after each one. This
approach has shown strong results for many tasks, but has limita-
tion when the samples are related in time, such as audio signals,
speech, video and many other important areas. The main difference
between RNNs and the standard feed-forward neural networks is
the ability to maintain the state between the inputs and selectively
pass information based on the internal state. While very powerful,
RNNs were found to be hard to train due to a vanishing and explod-
ing gradient problem caused by back-propagations across many
time steps. This problem has been addressed by a special type of
RNNs, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) networks [16] as well as
the use of the Truncated Back-propagation Through Time (TBTT)
technique [40]. We employed both techniques in our work.
4.2 Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are feed-forward neural net-
works that became popular in image processing after the ground-
breaking work of LeCunn et al. [23]. CNNs significantly increase the
efficiency of neural networks by applying convolutions, which are
basically filters, to small regions of the input instead of performing
matrix multiplication over the entire image at once.
While traditional CNNs used in image processing are 2D, 1D
CNNs can be successfully used for time series processing, because
time series have a strong 1D (time) locality that can be successfully
extracted by convolutions [22]. In this work we show that 1D CNNs
can be successfully used for detecting cyberattacks in complex
multivariant ICS data.
5 ANOMALY DETECTION METHOD
We used the following statistical window-based anomaly detection
method in our research. A neural network model predicts the future
values of the data features based on previous values. We provide the
network with a sequence (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) to predict a sequence
(yn ,yn+1, . . . ,yn+m ) where xi and yi are input and output vectors
of feature values at time i .
As expected, the network cannot precisely predict the behavior
of the system, which is highly non-linear and dependent on many
factors, some of which are environmental and others of which are
dictated by the controller program logic. Moreover, it was observed
that specific features can be predicted better than others. There-
fore, in order to detect anomalies we have chosen the following
statistical approach. We calculate the absolute difference between
the expected yˆt and observed yt values for each feature at time t .
®et =
®y − ®ˆy (1)
µe and σe (the mean and standard deviation of the prediction error)
are calculated overall of the data. In test time, for each prediction, we
calculate the absolute value of the difference between the prediction
and the observation and normalize it using the mean and standard
deviation for each feature. We effectively have a z-score of the
probability of the prediction error for each feature:
®zet =
 ®et − µe 
σe
(2)
A threshold for the z-scores is used for the anomaly/attack detection.
If the maximal value across all the features passes this threshold,
we enter the anomaly detection state.
max ®zet > T (3)
However, due to irregularities and abrupt state changes in some
features (e.g. pump on/off state) such deviations can exist but do
not signify a cyberattack event. In order to account for this behav-
ior and reduce the number of false alarms the threshold T must
be maintained for at least a specified duration of time, i.e. a time
window denoted byW . The threshold T and minimal time window
W are hyperparameters for the algorithm and are empirically deter-
mined as will be described later. T basically defines the confidence
level in the result. The final decision for an anomaly Ai at time i is
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Figure 4: Attack 30 and its impact on the system
determined by the following equation:
Ai =
i∏
t=i−W
max ®zei > T (4)
Thus, we detect windows of anomalous behavior by deviation of
prediction error from the observed statistics beyond the selected
threshold for at least the selected time window. If the detected
anomaly intersects with the attack period extended by a constant
extra time immediately following the attack, we consider the attack
to be detected. The reason for adding the extra time is the fact that
the attacks usually leave an impact on the system and the system’s
anomalous behavior occasionally continues much longer that the
attack does. We measure the detection performance based on the
number of the attacks detected successfully (attack-based scoring).
We have found this detection method superior to the one used in
[18], where the authors referred to the number of correctly detected
log records. The best way to explain our choice is by considering
an example. Figure 4 shows the water level reported by the LIT101
sensor during and after an attack targeting the first stage of the
system and aiming to underflow the first water tank (attack number
30 in the SWaT dataset).
In order to reach the attack goal, the water level reported by the
sensor is fixed at 700mm and the pump that pumps the water out
of the tank is turned on continuously. The black vertical lines in
the figure indicate the attack period. The figure shows a recovery
period following the actual attack. During this recovery period the
system is not behaving normally, and thus detecting this time period
as anomalous is correct. If the detection performance is measured
by correctly detecting the log records, then the records from the
recovery period classified as anomalous would be considered false
positives, as there was no attack at this time. We believe that the
attack-based scoring reflects the dynamics of ICS systems under
attacks better than its log record-based alternative. Another reason
for our choice is the observation that the dataset is imbalanced and
the number of attack log records represents about 12% of all of the
log records; thus the log records-based approach is biased unless
we can balance the dataset (which is not trivial in our case). As in
real systems the ratio of attack to normal log records is expected
to be even smaller, and thus we consider using log records-based
precision and recall metrics less accurate.
An alternative approach to anomaly detection used in [8] is
the CUSUM algorithm [30]. CUSUM is a classical algorithm for
change detection in time series data. In CUSUM, the high and low
cumulative sums, SH and SL respectively are calculated using the
following regressive equation:
SH0 = SL0 = 0
SHn+1 = max(0, Sn + x + n + ω) (5)
SLn+1 = min(0, Sn + x + n + ω)
In order to decide whether an anomaly has occurred, the authors
of [8] compare the SH and SL to the Upper Control Limit (UCL)
and Lower control Limit (LCL) correspondingly. If SH > UCL or
SL < LCL an anomaly is detected. The UCL and LCL were de-
fined empirically for each feature. This algorithm was tested in our
research as well but we did not use it for the following reasons:
• the statistical method produced better results, and
• the proposed CUSUM method requires choosing more hy-
perparameters (two per feature instead of just two).
6 EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS
6.1 Setup
Model training and testing was performed on two Intel i7-6700K
workstations with 32GB of RAM using a NVIDIA 8GB 1080 GPU.
Training was performed until the validation loss stopped decreas-
ing or until it hit its maximum iteration of 100 epochs. Training
times varied greatly as we’ll show in section 6.5. The models were
implemented using Google’s TensorFlow framework version 1.4
[9]. Specifically, we used the low-level API which allowed for fine-
grained control over the network architecture. We also evaluated
an implementation based on the Keras library [3], but found that
TensorFlow provided slightly faster training and test times.
6.2 Data Preprocessing
Since this research focuses on physical layer attacks, we only used
the "Physical" subdirectory containing the data collected from the
sensors and actuators each second. The data collected under normal
conditions has 496,800 data records and the data collected while
performing attacks has 449,919 records with 36 attacks among them.
The attacks usually span hundreds of seconds, with the shortest one
being just 100 seconds and the longest one taking 35899 seconds,
the second longest was 1,689 seconds. The first 16,000 records of the
training data were trimmed, as the system was unstable (see figure
5). In addition, the data was normalized to (0,1) scale. The minimal
and maximal values of features from the training set were saved
and used for scaling the test set. It should be noted that in our final
setup we scale both contiguous (e.g. water level) and categorical (e.g.
motor valve closed) values to the (0,1) scale. This generalizes our
architecture to different data types.
Several data augmentation techniques were tested, but only one
produced an increase in detection score. Specifically, in order to
enrich the data with high-order features, the data is concatenated
with newly engineered features representing the difference between
the current value of the feature and a past value with the given lag.
This difference carries the approximation of the derivative of the
4
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Figure 5: Growth of theWater Level Measured by the LIT101
Sensor During the Initial Warm Up Period
feature at the given moment of time.
®xt = ®xt |(®xt − ®xt−laд) (7)
The final transformation we apply to the data is to divide it
into batches to speed up the computations. The number of batches
we tried was varied from one to 100. Larger numbers of batches
provided faster training time. The normal dataset (no attacks) was
split: 80% for training and 20% for testing.
Several prediction mode alternatives were tested. One was a
sequence-to-sequence model where n timesteps of input were used
to predictm timesteps of output, where
1 <=m <= n. (8)
so that the sequence (xi ,xi+1, . . . ,xi+n−1) is used to predict a se-
quence (yj ,yj+1, . . . ,yj+m ) where xi and yj are input and output
vectors of feature values at times i and j correspondingly. Also
i < j < n + 1. (9)
In other words, the predicted sequence is at most as long as the input
one; the predicted sequence starts after the input one and either
overlaps with it or strictly follows it. Better results were achieved
by predicting a single vector (i.e. sequence-to-vector prediction),
so that
m = 1
j = n. (10)
The prediction mode described above necessitate that the data
batches be extended in order to be able to predict all of the output
values. This is best explained with an example. Suppose there are
10 points split into two batches, each with five points. Thus the first
batch of five points is used to predict the first point in the second
batch. Now consider the last four points of the second batch. They
are not predicted, as there are not enough points at the end of the
first batch to predict them. With 100 batches of 200 points each,
there will be 19,900 points that the model haven’t been trained on.
In order to solve this problem, the first batch is extended, appending
the first 4 points of the second batch to the end of the first batch
Batch 0 X
Y
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
Batch 1 X
Y
10 11 12 13 14
5 6 7 8 9
5 6 7 8
Yellow – inputs
Green – outputs
Grey - extensions
Timesteps
Figure 6: Batches and their extension
so that they can be used them to predict points six to nine in our
example see figure 6.
6.3 Architectures Used
We began our experiments with recurrent neural networks, a popu-
lar neural network architecture approach for processing time series
data[26]. As Figure 7 shows, we feed the network a sequence of
length N , pass it through a number of stacked LSTM layers and
apply a fully connected layer at the end to produce the prediction.
Initially, we predicted the time window following the input, e.g.
feeding the first 200 seconds of data in order to predict the following
200 seconds. This pattern continues, and in the next iteration we
use seconds 201 - 400 to predict seconds 401 - 600 and so on. In
later experiments we followed a different pattern, using only the
last value of the output sequence as a prediction for the single data
point immediately following the input sequence, i.e., as second 201
in our example.
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
Fully Connected
x1x0 x2 xn
y0 y1 y2 ym
Input sequence shape:
[batches, 
backpropagation_length,
features]
Output sequence shape:
[batches, 
prediction_length,
features]
K LSTM layers with state 
size S
Figure 7: Basic LSTM Model
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LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
Fully Connected
x1x0 x2 xn
y0 y1 y2 ym
Input sequence shape:
[batches, 
backpropagation_length, 
features]
Output sequence shape:
[batches, 
prediction_length, 
features]
Encoding LSTM layers
LSTM LSTM LSTM LSTM
Decoding LSTM layers
Internal state
Internal state embeds 
the encoding and is 
passed to decoders
Figure 8: LSTM Autoencoder Model
Weusemean squared error (MSE) as a loss function andAdamOp-
timizer [21] with learning decay for all experiments.
MSE =
1
n
n∑
t=1
Yi − Yˆi (11)
We’ve experimentedwithmultiple learning rates and learning decay
strategies. The learning rates were usually in the range of 0.001
- 0.00001, and the decay rate ranged from 0.9 to 0.99. We tested
various depths of LSTM layers (from one to 10), state size range
from 64 to 2048 and sequence lengths between 50 and 1000. In
addition to the basic LSTM recurrent network, we experimented
with gated recurrent cell (GRU)[2], replacing the LSTM cells and
with bidirectional recurrent neural network architecture [32] based
on LSTM cells. Another recurrent network architecture tested was
an encoder-decoder LSTM network, based on the ideas in [35] and
[2]. We encode the input sequence using layers of LSTMs, then we
use the state of the last encoder layer as an input to a stack of LSTM
decoders’ layers that predict the output sequence, as can be seen in
Figure 8. It should be noted that only the embedding represented
by the internal state of the encoders is copied to the decoders, not
the encoders output.
We also tested was convolutional neural networks, and more
specifically 1D CNNs, which can be seen in Figure 9 in a number
of alternative architectures.
The most basic architecture follows the classical convolution-
ReLU-MaxPooling scheme, where convolutions are 1D and applied
to each feature separately along the time axis. We experimented
with kernel sizes ranging from two to four and different filter sizes.
Typically, we doubled filter size with each layer. The stack of convo-
lutional layers is followed by a fully connected layer that predicts
the output. We used a dropout [34] layer to prevent overfitting.
As described above, the network is fed a sequence of points and
predicts a single subsequent data point consisting of a number of
features (see Figure 9. In an attempt to improve the performance
of the network, we also experimented with batch normalization as
described in [19]. The batch normalization layer goes between the
convolutional and ReLU layers. As 1D convolutions are applied to
single features along the time axis, the model only learns dependen-
cies between combinations of features in the last fully connected
layer. In order to infuse more knowledge about features’ interde-
pendencies we added an additional fully connected layer before the
network, which extends the number of features we feed into the
CNNs, as can be seen in Figure 10.
In addition to the classic CNN architecture (CONV-RELU-POOL),
we tested other popular CNN architectures. Specifically, we replaced
the basic CONV-RELU-POOL block with (CONV − RELU ) × N −
MAXPOOL as found in VGG [33]. We also experimented with re-
placing the convolutional layers with Inception layers following the
original architecture described in [37]. Inception layers are known
to provide superior performance while keeping computational cost
low. We used the implementation in [13] as a reference for the in-
ception layer. One of the most recent advances in CNN architecture
involves the use of residual networks or ResNet [11]. We used a
reference implementation of the more recent version of ResNet
[12], which can be seen in Figure 11.
Finally, we tested a combined architecture, where we process
the data by a stack of convolutional (or inception) layers and then
pass the output to LSTM layers, which make the prediction; this
can be seen in figure 12.
6.4 Hyperparameters Tuning
First, we performed our tests on the data from the first stage (P1) of
the six-stage process. As P1 has only five features we were able to
obtain the results relatively quickly. In addition, it should be easier
to detect anomalies in the behavior of the first stage, as because at
this point in the process as there are no prior stages influencing the
internal system state. Our tests had a large parameter space that
included: input sequence length, network internal state size, output
sequence length, the lag between input and output, network depth,
dropout value and type (variational vs. regular), CNN kernel size
and number of filters, pooling algorithm and size and others. We
usually used a grid search strategy to explore the hyperparameters.
We selected F1 score as our performance metric. F1 is calculated
according to
F1 = 2 · precision · recall
precision + recall
(11)
The precision and recall are calculated based on attack detection
rate according to the anomaly detection algorithm described in
section 5. We chose F1 score of all possible Fβ scores, as we place
equal importance on avoiding false positives and false negatives.
While conducting the experiments, we discovered that the detection
results vary for multiple runs of the same configuration. This is due
to the low number of attacks and the resulting significant impact of
a single mispredicted attack. Therefore we present average scores
for multiple (usually five to 10) runs of the same configuration.
As explained in section 5, we use the neural network to predict
the output and compare it to the actual output, detecting attacks
using the window and threshold hyperparameters. To determine the
optimal hyperparameters for the model and stage we perform a grid
search over time windows from 50 to 300 seconds and thresholds
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Figure 9: 1d Convolutional Neural Network Model
between 1.8 and 3.0, optimizing for the best F1 with the highest
threshold to insure higher confidence.
6.5 Results
We first show that the selected neural network can learn the system
features and predict them with adequate precision. We measure
the prediction accuracy by observing the steady decrease in the
training and validation error values until a sufficiently low value
is reached for each. We found that given enough computational
power all of the neural networks were able to achieve an RMSE in
range of 0.02 or less after a small numbers of training epochs. By
"enough computational power" we refer to the size of the internal
x1
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Input sequence shape:
[batches, 
sequence_length, 
features]
Output sequence shape:
[batches, 1, features]
Output sequence shape:
[batches, sequence_length, 
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CNN
Figure 10: Features Enrichment Before CNN
state for LSTMs, the number of filters in CNNs, and the number
of layers in both. We found that this level of error can usually be
achieved with two or more layers. Increasing it further does not
greatly improve the model accuracy, although some architectures
converged faster than others.
As shown in Figure 13, LSTMs and inception-based convolution
converge the fastest and produce the lowest training error rate,
but other configurations are not far behind and produce similar
results with more iterations (only the first 16 iterations are shown).
As seen in Figure 14, validation errors also consistently decreased,
x
+
Y
Figure 11: ResNet block
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Figure 13: Training Errors
converging to the same error range. The rate of test errors was also
small, however LSTM-based models showed better convergence
than pure CNNs, except for the eight layer CNN, which had a
stable test error level. We also estimated the AUC of the selected
anomaly detection method based on per record detection metrics.
The reason for using per record labels for the AUC is the ease of
defining the number of negative instances, which is problematic
in the case of per-attack detection (it is impossible to measure
how many non-attacks there are). As Figure 16 shows, the anomaly
detection algorithm provides high AUC, reaching 0.967 for the eight
layers convolutional network.
It is interesting to compare the training and test times, as well as
different model sizes, as can be seen in figures 17 - 19. The figures
show average times per epoch, as measured at the workstation
machines described in section 6.1. The training and testing times
of convolutional networks were shorter by a factor 10 to 20 for
testing and 15 to 40 for training compared to a pure LSTM network.
The training and testing times of a convolutional network with
additional LSTM layers were also significantly shorter than of a pure
LSTM network, as the convolutional layers significantly decreased
the length of sequence input for the recurrent layers. As for the
model sizes, adding more convolutional layers leads to significantly
larger models, given our decision to double the number of filters in
each layer. These large models were still very fast to train and test.
Comparing the four layers CNN with a three layer LSTM shows
that the LSTM model is 30 times larger than the CNN model.
Next we present the attack detection performance comparison
at individual stages. The results presented are averaged over 5-10
runs of the same configuration. As there are many hyperparam-
eters for each configuration we present the best combination. As
Figure 20 shows, pure CNN networks demonstrated better anomaly
detection results than their LSTM alternatives. We can also see that
the inception layers had no advantage over simple convolutions.
The best results were achieved with eight layers convolutional net-
work, but a four layers network was not far behind and sometimes
surpassed the eight layers CNN, while being much smaller and
faster to train. There are two stages in the SWaT testbed, P2 and
P6, which achieved inferior results (average F1 < 0.6). In order to
understand the reason for this, one needs to consider the nature of
attacks related to these stages. For example, in the P6 stage, some
of the sensors and actuators were not used for data collection; in
addition, there is only one attack that involves this stage, thus its
detection results are not representative. Other works using this
dataset [24] also excluded P6 from the study. As for the attacks in
the P2 satage, there are only four (6,24,29,30) such attacks in the
database and they include one (29) that did not achieve the desired
effect (due to a mechanical interlock) and another (24) that did not
have the expected impact according to the test description. Thus
we can conclude that the relatively low F1 score for the P2 stage is
caused by the test setup and our model successfully detected the
attacks were actually carried out.
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In order to determine which attacks are not discovered by our
detection method (the tests were done on a four and eight layer con-
volutional networks), we took an ensemble approach, and combined
the detection results for individual stages. We discovered that only
four attacks were consistently undetected: attack numbers 4, 13, 14
and 29. When reviewing the description of these tests we found that
these attacks failed to have their expected impact on the system;
thus, it is reasonable that they were undetected. When combining
the attacks detected in individual stages, the model successfully
detected 32 of 36 attacks, thus improving upon the reported results
obtained in [18]. The F1 score of the ensemble of four layers 1D
CNN model was 0.9206, with precision of 1 and recall of 0.8529.
We also observed that when trained on the data of all of the the
stages together, the model achieves slightly lower F1: 0.688 for
four layers and 0.775 for eight layers. In contrast to performing per
attack calculations, when calculating per log record detection, the
F1 for the model trained on the data of all of the stages together
was 0.817 for four layers and 0.861 for eight layers, thus improving
over previously shown results [18]. We estimate that the reason
the F1 of the single combined model is smaller than the ensemble
F1 of the individual stages is that the proposed architectures were
too small to capture all the complex dependencies across different
stages including time delays between these dependencies. Tables 1
and 2 summarize the averaged results of the best working network
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configuration presented in the figures above. The main hyperpa-
rameters of the configurations appear in the tables. While this paper
was being written, new research was published [24], which uses a
novel graphical model-based approach for anomaly detection with
the SWaT data set. In order to make a comprehensive comparison
with previous work, a recall evaluation per attack scenario was
conducted and the results of this evaluation are presented in tables
3 and 4. The comparison shows that a 1D CNN provides recall
improvement in almost all of the cases. It should be noted that in
table 4 the recall was calculated based on attack detection and not
on individual record detection as explained earlier in section 5.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we studied the use of deep learning architectures,
namely convolutional and recurrent neural networks for cyberat-
tacks detection in ICSs. We tested a number of architectures and
hyperparameters and proposed a statistical window-based anomaly
detection method that has been shown effective in detecting the
attacks in the SWaT dataset. We introduced a model based on 1D
convolutional neural network that successfully detected 32 out of 36
attacks. Its superior run time and performance have been elaborated
upon and show great promise for ICS cyberattack detections.
In our proposed 1D CNN architecture we apply 1D convolutions
to each feature across the time dimension. This has a number of
potential limitations. First, the model only learns mutual dependen-
cies between the features in the very last fully connected layer. In
order to address this limitation, we introduced a fully connected
layer in the very beginning of the data flow, enriching the feature
space. Second, 1D CNNs are stateless and lack the ability to learn
beyond the sequence used as a sample. We addressed this by aug-
menting the feature space by adding features’ first derivatives as
additional features. This provided slightly better results, however
we found that using second derivatives and a few other methods
did not result in additional improvements.
In the current research we found that having a dedicated model
for each stage produces better results than having a single model
for the whole system. One possible reason for that relates to the
limitations of the hardware used for building a model large enough
to represent all of the stages and their dependencies (including time
dependencies) together. In addition to superior results, training
separate models for stages will scale better than a single model, but
the ways to learn inter-stage dependencies need to be examined.
The research performed was not based on assumptions regarding
the modeled system and its attacks, and thus we expect it results to
be generic. At the same time, one potential threat to the research
validity is the fact that it was tested on a single dataset from a
single type of industrial process. Another potential validity limiting
direction is the fact that the attacks were relatively simple and
spoofed only small subset of features.
As the research focused on the ability to detect cyberattacks,
it would be beneficial to test the method’s ability to detect faulty
equipment behavior, which is another kind of anomalous ICS be-
havior.
Beyond addressing these limitations this research can be ex-
panded in a number of directions:
• studying methods for learning cross-stage behavioral fea-
tures,
• studying methods for embedding high-order process model-
ing for anomaly detection,
• investigating the application of recent audio generative net-
work architectures, e.g. WaveNet [39] to anomaly detection,
• applying the proposed anomaly detection method to stream-
ing data and comparing its performance other real-time al-
gorithms,
• improving the interpretability of the results, and
• applying the anomaly detection method to faulty ICS equip-
ment behavior detection.
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